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SOME ASPECTS OF EMPLOYEE DEMOCRACY
UNDER THE WAGNER ACT
JACOB M. MURDOCK

I.
A wide variety of interesting decisions have resulted from certain conflicting purposes in the law of collective bargaining. This subject of conflict
concerns a change of bargaining representatives during the life of a collective
bargaining agreement, or following a prior certification of a bargaining agent
by the Board. The problems presented are both of law in that there is a
dashing of legal concepts, and of practical policy in the functioning of the
collective bargaining process. Often where existing statutes are silent, the
interplay of sociological and economic forces require that directive decisions
be made.
Workers, having selected an agent, have many bona fide reasons for later
desiring a change. Dissatisfaction with one union often arises where the
rank and file feel that their union has not achieved necessary and desirable
gains for the employees. In a particular field of collective bargaining, rival
unions often newly appear, promising greater advantages to the workers
than the certified organization. In many cases, the existing representative
may lack internal democracy which another organization can provide; or
malfeasance, practiced by strongly intrenched union officers, may make the
existing representative no longer desirable. In a democratic economy, employees must not be subjected to the yoke of monopoly from within their
own union whose avowed purpose is to further their interests, but which
under certain circumstances may be used to exploit the workers for the
benefit of those in control.
We find in Section I of the National Labor Relations Act1 the stated purpose to protect the workers' "full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation" of bargaining representatives. This would seem to indicate
that employees are free at any time and as often as they desire to change
their representative. Moreover, Section 9 (c) 2 contains no exception to
the Board's administrative duty to investigate and certify an appropriate
agent "whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees. .. ." Yet, one must realize that the problems concurrent with a change of representative have only achieved their degree of
149 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940).
249 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (1940).
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importance as the theory and application of collective bargaining have been
accepted by and become a part of our economic society. The drafters of
the Labor Act were thinking mainly of the initial decision to be made by
the workers and were most concerned that this decision should not be influenced by forces antagonistic to the stated rights of emproyees. The primary
job was to establish a system of collective bargaining in an economic society
which bad thus far fought it, and refused to accept the idea as necessary
or desirable. Many problems of the future could not be specifically foreseen
or provided for. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that there is no definite
specification in the statute regarding a desire on the part of the workers to
change their representative after making their initial choice.
The right of employees to change their bargaining agent freely is opposed
by another desideratum in our system of industrial and labor relations. This
is stability. Continual changing of representatives is invariably accompanied
by continual labor strife. This in turn upsets production and economic conditions generally. The machinery of collective bargaining should prevent
unnecessary conflicts, especially those which do not directly aim at the betterment of working conditions and peaceful labor relations. The Labor Act
encourages the practice and procedure of collective bargaining for the stated
purpose that industrial relations may be stabilized. It naturally follows then
that promiscuous use of the right to change representatives is to be discouraged. Public and business interests wish to be able to place reliance on
a particular arrangement which has been properly achieved; and it would
seem to be politic to say they have a right to do so. It is for this reason
that historically there has been a constant struggle to protect contractual
rights both in the courts and out of them. In any field of endeavor, relationships, once set up, must be given reasonable opportunity to function and
produce results. Thus, the right to change bargaining representatives cannot
be so absolute as to permit workers to substitute one agent for another whenever the spirit moves them.
The National Labor Relations Board's policy in dealing with these cases
has been one of weighing the clashing interests, and slowly developing a
set of general rules through its decisions, to be applied as a guide in a particular case. The employees' guaranteed statutory right to select and change
their bargaining representatives freely is balanced against the interest of
the employe.es and the public in industrial stability.
A specific discussion of the various factual situations where this question
of change of representatives arises, and of the general rules which the Board
has adopted, follows.
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If there is no contract in existence, the Board, regardless of the workers'
wishes, will usually deny a rival's request for certification for a reasonable
period-usually one year following the original certification. 8 In In the Matter
of Kimberly-Clark Corporation,4 the Board said: "We have consistently held,
both in unfair labor practice cases involving Section 8 (5) of the Act, and
in cases arising under Section 9 (c), that a Board election and certification
must be treated as identifying the statutory bargaining agent with certainty
and finality for a reasonable period of time-about a year, under ordinary
circumstances. This policy serves the dual purpose of encouraging the
execution of collective bargaining contracts and of discouraging 'raiding'
and too frequent elections. It means, in operation, that a demand for recognition, or petition for investigation of representatives, filed unseasonably
early in the year following a certification, will be ineffective to raise a question concerning representation, for the certification is deemed to foreclose
any such question for a reasonable time." 5 However, as previously pointed
out, this rule is only a guide, and exception will be made where there is
evidence of an unusually large shift in employee desires, or where, for
example, quick expansion or contraction of the plant is occurring due to
the war or to reconversion. 6
SIn the Matter of U. S. Stamping Company,15 N. L. R. B. 172 (1938) ; In the Matter
of General Motors Corporation, 24 N. L. R. B. 159 (1940) ; In the Matter of Aluminum
Company of America, Newark Works, 57 N. L. R. B. 913 (1944); In the Matter of
Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 57 N. L. R. B. 1684 (1944); In the Matter
of American Woolen Company (National and Providence Mills), 61 N. L. R. B. 1045
(1945); In the Matter of Monarch Aluminum Manufacturing Company, 41 N. L. R. B.
1 (1942); In the Matter of Beatty Logging Company, 55 N. L. R. B. 810 (1944);
In the Matter of Whittier Mills Company, 15 N. L. R. B. 457 (1939), enf'd 111 F.
(2d) 474 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) ; In the Matter of Botany Worsted Mills, 41 N. L. R. B.
218 (1942), enf'd 133 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 751,
63 Sup. Ct. 1164 (1942) ; In the Matter of Century Oxford Manufacturing Corporation,
47 N. L. R. B. 835 (1943), enf'd 140 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ; In the Matter
of Motor Valve and Manufacturing Company, 58 N. L. R. B. 1057 (1944), entf'd
149 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945); Frank Brothers v. National Labor Relations
Board, 321 U. S. 702, 64 Sup. Ct. 817 (1944) ; In the Matter of Con P. Curran Printing Company, 67 N. L. R. B. No. 192 (1946); National Labor Relations Board v.
Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945).
461 N. L. R. B. 90, 92 (1945).
5
PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.7 (c) and R. I. ACTS AND REsoLvEs (1941)
c. 1066, § 6 (5) make certifications effective for at least a year. Wis. STAT. (1945)
§ 111.05 (4) provides that the fact that one election has been held shall not prevent
the holding of another election "provided that it appears to the Board that sufficient
reason therefore exists." Note: In a few instances, state statutes are cited to illustrate
how a particular problem has been handled by legislation other than national. However,
this article does not include a coverage of interpretation and policy under the various
only.
state
6 acts-being limited to the federal field
1n the Matter ,of New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company, 2 N. L. R. B. 595
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In a recent decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals forced an exception on
the Board, under what it considered an unusual set of facts. The case was
National Labor Relations Board v. Intercity Advertising Company, Incy
On May 12, 1944 the Board certified a union as representative of technicians working at the transmitter of a radio station. The company felt that
this selection of bargaining unit was incorrect; that employees at the studio
should also have been included. They notified the Board and the union of
their refusal to bargain in order to get a hearing on the issue under charges
which the union would bring. At the time of the Board's election, the vote
had been three for-and one against-the union. During the rest of the
year, normal changes in the business resulted in only one union man out of
three being at the transmitter. At the subsequent hearing, the Board found
the employer guilty of violating section 8 (5) of the Act, but not guilty of
any other unfair practices. The Circuit Court refused enforcement of the
order to bargain, saying that they would not order an employer to bargain
with a union which had lost its majority, where the change has not been occasioned by the refusal of the employer to bargain or by any other illegal practice on his part. The court based its conclusion on the distinction that in all
similar cases in point, the employer was guilty of an unfair labor practice of
some sort, whereas here the Board had specifically found him innocent of all
unfair practices except a refusal to bargain. A dissenting opinion urged that
this decision neglected the rule that a bargaining relationship, once established, must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in
which it can be given a fair chance to succeed. The wrongful refusal to bargain collectively with the certified union cannot be twisted into a defense
because the facts change during the period of such refusal. It would seem
that the dissent here is the stronger argument, and that the Board does not
exceed its broad power by insisting that a company bargain with a certified
union, even where the loss of majority has not demonstrably been due either
to an unfair refusal to bargain or to any other unfair labor practice.
Where no union has been designated by an election, the Board will order
8
a new election in less than a year.
During the War, another exception arose where a newly certified representative failed to achieve an initial bagaining agreement because of the
(1937) ; In the Matter of Novelty Slipper Company, 5 N. L. R. B. 264 (1938) ; In the

Matter of Moulton Ladder Manufacturing Company, 31 N. L. R. B. 665 (1941); In
the Matter of Aluminum Company, 52 N. L. R. B. 1040 (1943); In the Matter of
M. R. Moller, 56 N. L. R. B. 16 (1944).
7154 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
Sin the Matter of Chrysler Corporation, 37 N. L. R. B. 877 (1941) ; In the Matter
of New York Central Iron Works, 37 N. L. R. B. 894 (1941).
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necessity of National War Labor Board approval or decision regarding the
agreement. In these cases the National Labor Relations Board held that the
period of immunity enjoyed by a certified representative would be extended
beyond the usual year where the delay was the cause of the certified union
not securing a contract. 9
Normally, a valid written contract for a definite and reasonable term
will bar a determination of representatives until the expiration date approaches.10 A contract which, although it may specify a duration period, is
actually terminable at the option of either party, does not bar an election ;11
but an agreement which contains merely a provision allowing the parties
to negotiate for modifications of its terms, without enabling either party
unilaterally to terminate the contractual relationship, is not construed as
terminable at will. 2 The contract must fix at least some important terms
and conditions of employment. In In the Matter of Standard Oil Company,13
the Board held that an exclusive contract for a definite term which incorporated a wage agreement as well as a procedure for the settlement of grievances and the negotiation of other collective bargaining questions, was adequate to meet this test, and accordingly operated as a bar to determining
representatives.' 4 In the event the contracting union becomes defunct, the
rule becomes inoperative, and an election will be held prior to the expiration
of the agreement.' 5
9In the Matter of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 50 N. L. R. B. 306
(1943) ; In the Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 58 N. L. R. B. 24 (1944) ;

In the Matter of Taylor Forge and Pipe Works, 58 N. L. R. B. 1375 (1944); In the

Matter of Montgomery Ward and Company, 60 N. L. R. B. 574 (1945) ; In the Matter
of American Locomotive Company, 67 N. L. R. B. No. 175 (1946); cf. In the Matter
of Spencer Lens Company, 58 N. L. R. B. 953 (1944); In the Matter of Federal
Screws Works, 61 N. L. R. B. 387 (1945); In the Matter of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company, 64 N. L. R. B. 750 (1945).
'i0 n the Matter of Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N. L. R. B. 111 (1940); In the
Matter of Superior Electric Products Company, 6 N. L. R. B. 19 (1938) ; In the
Matter of Pierce Contracting and Stevedoring Company, Inc., 20 N. L. R. B. 1061
(19401; In the Matter of Pressed Steel Car Company, Inc., 36 N. L. R. B. 560 (1941);
In the Matter of Monarch Aluminum Manufacturing Company, 41 N. L. R. B. 1 (1942).
The Board's earlier view was that the aims of the Act were furthered best by making

a change at any time the employees desired. See In the Matter of New England
Transportation
Company, 1 N. L. R. B. 130 (1936).
1
1In the Matter of Iona Desk Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 1522 (1945) ; In the Matter
of Summerill Tubing Company, 60 N. L. R. B. 896 (1945); In the Matter of Fischer
Lumber Company, 62 N. L. R. B. 543 (1945).
12In the Matter of Green Bay Drop Forge Company, 57 N. L. R. B. 1417 (1944);
In the Matter of Douglas Public Service Corporation, 62 N. L. R. B. 651 (1945).
1363 N. L. R. B. 1223 (1945).
14
But cf. In the Matter of The New York and Porto Rico Steamship Company,
58 N. L. R. B. 1301 (1944).

15In the Matter of Food Machinery Corporation, 36 N. L. R. B. 491 (1941) ; In the
Matter of Container Corporation of America, 61 N. L. R. B. 823 (1945) ; In the Matter
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I Usually the contract is later than the certification, so that a one-year contract works an extension of the period which would exist without the contract. But sometimes the contract precedes the certification and the question
arises whether the date of certification or the date of the contract will then
be used in ascertaining whether a reasonable time has elapsed. The Board
has held that the contract controls. In In the Matter of Thompson Products,
Inc.1 6 where, subsequent to an election but five months prior to the Board's
certification, the union and employer entered into a one-year contract, the
Board held that the contract date determined when another election might
17
be held.
The rule is well settled that a contract for one year constitutes a reasonable term, and recent decisions indicate that this time may be extended to
two years. Thus, in In the Matter of Uxbridge Worsted Company, Inc.,18 the
Board said: "In the absence of satisfactory proof that an effective two-year
contract runs counter to the well-established custom in the industry, or is
otherwise unreasonable in terms under the circumstances of the particular
case, we are presently of the opinion that, in the interest of industrial
stability, no investigation of representatives should be undertaken until such
contract is about to expire." Moreover, in In the Matter of Sutherland Paper
Company,'9 the Board explained that a petitiorier seeking an election in the
face of a two-year contract has the burden of establishing that the two-year
term 'is unreasonable. Agreements longer than one or two years may be
held reasonable if the evidence establishes that it is the custom in the industry
to enter into contracts of longer duration.20 A three-year contract, however,
will not be permitted to bar a new determination of representatives after
the first year unless the party urging the contract as a bar established that
this abnormally long term is supported by custom. In other words, the burden of proof appears at present to shift when the contractual term exceeds
two years.21
Contracts for indefinite or unduly long periods (where such contracts are
not justified by custom) will not be permitted to bar an election after they
of The Swartout Company, 61 N. L. R. B. 832 (1945) ; In the Matter of Black-Clawson
Company, 63 N. L. R. B. 773 (1945) ; In the Matter of News Syndicate Company, Inc.,
67 N. L. R. B. No. 153 (1946).
1647 N. L. R. B. 619 (1943).

171n the Matter of Trackson Company, 56 N. L. R. B. 917 (1944).
1860 N. L. R. B. 1395 (1945).
1964 N. L. R. B. 719 (1945).
2OIn
the Matter of Chicago Curled Hair Company56 N. L. R. B. 1674 (1944).
21
In the Matter of The A. S. Abell Company, 62 N. L. R. B. 1414 (1945); In the
Matter of Lexington Water Company, 58 N. L. R. B. 536 (1944); In the Matter of
United States Finishing Company, 63 N. L. R. B. 575 (1945).
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have been in effect for one year, because such contracts contravene the
statutory policy of protecting the employees' freedom to select and change
their representatives at reasonable intervals.2 During the War, contracts
with such provisions as "'to continue in force and effect during the period
m
of National Emergency," were held to fall into this category.2
A constant source of dispute is the question whether a valid contract
exists, such as will bar an investigation and certification, and, if it has existed,
whether it has been renewed. Negotiations between the parties during the
term of the contract often indicate a cancellation of the contract, or at least
the prevention of an automatic renewal. These issues require 2delicate
4
determinations of the difficult questions of fact which they present
In the event a rival union has asserted its claim to recognition, or has
filed its petition for certification with the Board, before the date when the
contract went into effect, or before the date when a renewal became operative,
the rule has long been that this put the employer on notice, and the Board
would make determination of the bargaining agent notwithstanding the existing contract. 25 A recent decision of the Board, In the Matter of General Elec22
1n the Matter of Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 56 N. L. R. B. 117
(1944); In the Matter of Universal. Pictures Company, 55 N. L. R. B. 52 (1944);
In the Matter of Standard Oil Company of California, 58 N. L. R. B. 569 (1944);,In
the Matter of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N. L. R. B. 662 (1938) ; In the Matter
of M. & J. Tracey, Inc., 12 N. L. R. B. 936 (1939) ; In the Matter of Volupte, Inc.,
22 N. L. R. B. 1029 (1940); In the Matter of Rosedale Knitting Company, 23 N. L.
R. B. 527 (1940) ; In the Matter of Lewis Steel Products Corporation, 23 N. L. R. B.
793 (1940) ; In the Matter of Kahn & Feldman, Inc., 30 N. L. R. B. 294 (1941) ; In
the Matter of Presto Recording Corporation, 34 N. L. R. B. 28 (1941) ; In the Matter
of J. Charles McCullough Seed Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 259 (1944); In the Matter of
Trailer Company of America, 51 N. L. R. B. 1106 (1943).
23
1n the Matter of Peerless Pump Division, Food Machinery Corporation, 67 N. L.
R. B. No. 131 (1946) ; In the Matter of Cotton Trade Warehouses, Inc., 68 N. L. R. B.
No.
24 7 (1946).
1n the Matter of Green Bay Drop Forge Company, 57 N. L. R. B. 1417 (1944);
In the Matter of Chicago Mill and Lumber Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 77 (1944); In
the Matter of Story and Clark Piano Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 185 (1944) ; cf. Heat
Transfer Products, Inc., 63 N. L. R. B. 1124 (1945) ; In the Matter of General Metals
Corporation, Worsted Mills, Inc., 63 N. L. R. B. 1446 (1945) ; In the Matter of National
Gypsum Company, 64 N. L. R. B. 59 (1945) ;, In the Matter of Great Bear Logging
Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 701 (1944); In the Matter of Swift & Company, 59 N. L. R. B.
1417 (1945); In the Matter of John Wood Manufacturing Company, Inc., 61 N. L.
R. 25B. 846 (1945) ; In the Matter of Iroquois Gas Corporation, 61 N. L. R. B. 302 (1945).
In the Matter of California Wool Scouring Company, 5 N. L. R. B. 782 (1938);
In the Matter of Silvray Lighting Inc., 18 N. L. R. B. 719 (1939); In the Matter of
Malden Electric Company, 33 N. L. R. B. 79 (1941); In the Matter of The Texas
Company, 64 N. L. R. B. 653 (1945) ; In the Matter of Whippany Paper Board Company, 61 N. L. R. B. 516 (1945) ; In the Matter of Cities Service Refining Company,
58 N. L. R. B. 28 (1944); In the Matter of The Mead Corporation, Heald Division,
63 N. L. R. B. 1129 (1945); In the Matter of American Smelting & Refining Company,
62 N. L. R. B. 1470 (1945).
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tric X-Ray Corporation,2 6 has placed a greater duty of diligence on the claiming union in this situation. An informal representation claim is no longer
sufficient to prevent a subsequent contract from constituting a'bar to investigation, unless it is followed within ten days by the claiming union's formal
petition to the Board. The members of the Board admitted that in previous
decisions they had not applied the contract-bar rule in situation. in which
rival claims antedated the execution or automatic renewal of the agreement,
nor had they made any distinction between informal claims and formally
filed petitions. They then stated the new rule to be: Where a petition is
filed more than ten days after the assertion of a bare claim for representation, and no extenuating circumstances appear, an agreement, otherwise valid,
which is executed in the interval should be held to constitute a bar. In
adopting this new position the Board reasons that "it is no longer desirable
to accord a mere naked assertion of majority equal dignity with that accorded
a petition." By requiring filing, a claim is subjected to scrutiny of the
Board, which prevents mere naked claims where there is no onus on the
claimant to substantiate his interest. Such bare claims should not be able to
2
defeat the legitimate bargaining process. 7
As suggested above, a common practice in contracts is to provide for automatic renewal of the contract at the end 6f the contract term, unless by a
stipulated number of day's notice negotiations are reopened by one of the
parties. An agreement renewed for a further term by the operation of such
a clause is given the same effect as an agreement newly made. The leading
decision on this is In the Matter of Mill B., Inc.28s where the Board discussed previous cases on the subject and upheld the validity of a sixty-day
automatic renewal provision stating that such provisions were common in
the field of collective bargaining agreements, and were within the policy of
the Wagner Act as they tended to promote stability of employer-employee
relations by avoiding a hiatus between contracts.2 9 The Board has con2667 N. L. R. B. No. 121 (1946).
271f after a claim to representation has been made a petition is dismissed, the claim
cannot be relied upon to prevent a contract from barring a determination of a representative in a new case instituted by the filing of a second petition. In the Matter of
Dolese & Sl!epard Company, 57 N. L. R. B. 1598 (1944).
2840 N. L. R. B. 346 (1942).
29
1n the Matter of National Sugar Refining Company, 10 N. L. R. B. 1410 (1939);
In the Matter of American Hair and Felt Company, 15 N. L. R. B. 572 (1939); In
the Matter of Hettrick Manufacturing Company, 25 N. L. R. B. 722 (1940); In the
Matter of Eaton Manufacturing Company, 29 N. L. R. B. 53 (1941) ; In the Matter
of New York Central Iron Works, 56 N.-L. R. B. 812 (1944) ; In the Matter of Elwood
Machine & Tool Company, 61 N. L. R. B. 1618 (1945); In the Matter of Green Bay
Drop Forge Company, 57 N. L. R. B. 1417 (1944). The Matter of Mill, B. case, supra
note 28, overruled In the Matter of the American Oak Leather Company, 31 N. L. R. B.
1155 (1941).

1946]

EMPLOYEE DEMOCRACY

sistently upheld thirty, sixty, or ninety-day automatic renewal provisions,
but not those which specify an unreasonably longer period. Custom in the
particular industry is the primary indication of what period of time is reasonable for this purpose30 Where a rival union has made proper claim to
representation before the operative date of an automatic renewal clause or
the effective date of a newly executed contract, the Board will proceed with
the determination of the representative.31 And, of course, even before In the
Matter of General Etectric X-Ray Corporation 2 the filing of a petition
prior to the effective date of an automatic renewal clause was sufficient to
render the contract inoperative as a bar.3 8 Likewise, where one of the parties
to the contract has forestalled operation of an automatic renewal clause by
giving timely notice to the other party, the contract cannot be relied upon
34
to bar action by the Board.
In iddition to the contracting parties, the employees themselves may prevent the operation of an automatic renewal clause and thereby terminate the
contract by showing, prior to the effective date of the clause, an intent to
choose a new bargaining representative.3 5 An interesting case on this matter is In the Matter of Dossin's Food Products.3 Here there was a closed
shop contract with an automatic renewal clause. At a meeting, the majority
of the employees voted to withdraw from the contracting union and affiliate
with the petitioning union. Prior to the operative date of the renewal clause,
two employees gave the employer a petition signed by less than a majority
of the employees, requesting termination of the contract and of check-off
thereunder, and enclosing a letter for the employer to send to the contracting
union, to terminate the contract. The two employees informed the employer
that a majority of the employees had affiliated with a new union. Then,
after the date of the renewal clause, the petitioning union apprised the
employer of its claim to representation, and initiated a representation case
301n the Matter of Toledo Edison Company, 63 N. L. R. B. 217 (1945); In the Matter
of 31New York Central Iron Works, 56 N. L. R. B. 812 (1944).
In the Matter of Craddock-Terry Shoe Corporation, 55 N. L. R. B. 1406 (1944);
In the Matter of Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 55 N. L. R. B. 521 (1944).
3267 N. L. R. B. No. 121 (1946).
33
In the Matter of Portland Lumber Mills, 56 N. L. R. B. 1336 (1944). Where the
petition alone is relied upon, the date when the petition was received and docketed by
the Board's office, rather than the date of mailing, controls. In the Matter of PointerWilliamette
Company, 64 N. L. R. B. 469 (1945).
34
In the Matter of American Woolen Company (Webster Mills), 57 N. L. R. B.
647 (1944) ; In the Matter of Purepac Corporation, 55 N. L. R. B. 1386 (1944).
3
5In the Matter of The Van Iderstine Company, 55 N. L. R. B. 1339 (1944); cf.
Triboro Coach Corporation v. Labor Relations Board, 286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. E. (2d)
315 (1941).
3656 N. L. R. B. 739 (1944).
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with the Board. The Board, with Commissioner Reilly dissenting, refused
to find that the contract precluded a new determination of a representative.
It reasoned that since the petitioning union could have served proper notice
prior to the operative date, there was no reason why a group of employees
claiming to represent the majority could not do the same thing. Mr. Reilly
argued that the Board's position was not tenable, because the petition had
not been signed by a majority of the workers. The General Electric X-Ray
case obviously limits this decision, but it would seem that if a minority of
the employees now file a petition with the Board within the required ten
days, claiming to represent a majority, this decision would validate their
57
prior effort, by notice to their employer, to prevent an automatic renewal.
Quite often a contract will prematurely renew or extend (by amendment)
an earlier agreement, thus apparently foreclosing the employees' opportunity to change their representative at the end of the original contract.
The Board has consistently held that such a renewal or extension will not
be a bar to a representation proceedings where the petitioning union files its
claim prior to the expiration of the old contract.-" This has been held even
where the contract prematurely made was executed in good faith without
any intent to evade the Act.39
Contracts which violate important provisions of, the Act are never a bar
to investigation and certification. Examples occur where the employer bargains with the minority union, or where the contract is made with an
40
employer-dominated organization.
371n the Matter of Colonie Fibre Company, 9 N. L. R. B. 658 (1938) ; see Triboro
Coach Corporation v. Labor Relations Board, 286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. E. (2d) 315 (1941),
(dissenting opinion) cited by the Board In the Matter of Mill B., Inc., 40 N. L. R. B.
346, 352 (1942). An employee, or any person acting on behalf of employees, may peti-

tion under Section 9 (q) of the Act. National Labor Relations Board, Rules and

Regulations, Series 3, Art. III, Sedtion 1.
SsIn the Matter of Memphis Furniture Manufacturing Company, 51 N. L. R. B.
1447 (1943) (Partly overruling In the Matter of Valve Bag Company, 50 N. L. R. B.
481 (1943)) ; In the Matter of Wichita Union Stockyards Company, 40 N. L. R. B. 369
(1942); In the Matter of Virginia-Lincoln Corporation, 63 N. L. R. B. 590 (1945);
In the Matter of American White Cross Laboratories, Inc., 60 N. L. R. B. 1148 (1945) ;
cf. In the Matter of Erie Concrete & Steel Supply Company, 55 N. L. R. B. 1124

(1944)
; In the Matter of United States Finishing Company, 63 N. L. R. B. 575 (1945).
39In the Matter of Michigan Light Alloys Corporation, 58 N. L. R. B. 113 (1944).
"Recently however, In the Matter of Swift and Company, 64 N. L. R. B. 880, Chairman

Herzog expressed doubt whether the so called premature extension doctrine should

apply in a situation where the extending contract is made in good faith and in the
absence of any conflicting claims or knowledge thereof." 10th Annual Report, National
Labor
40 Relations Board, p. 20, n. 30.
For the latter type of situation, see National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct. 571 (1938) ; International Association
of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 72, 61 Sup. Ct. 83 (1940).
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An interesting problem arises where a union, in a collective bargaining
contract, has agreed not to organize or represent a certain class of employees
employed by the contracting company. Then, later, but while the contract
is in effect, the union brings a representation petition to represent the
employees so excluded. The Board orginally adopted the view that the contractual provision contravened the policy of the Wagner Act, by bargaining
away rights guaranteed to the employees, and therefore should not be recognized by a dismissal of the petition. 41 In the Matter of Briggs Indiana
Corporation overruled this view and all cases following it.42 Here, still holding the contract a violation of the Act, a divided Board held that the intervention of the Board would be withheld from a union which thus sought
to avoid its commitment. Mr. Reilly, who had dissented from the Board's
original policy, concurred on the grounds of estoppel. Mr. Houston dissented, following the reasoning of the In the Matter of Briggs Manufacturing
case,43 now overruled. Thus, while agreed in principle that the union's
contract is illegal, the Board as yet, is in disagreement on the application
of the general rule to this particular situation.
A temporary situation, affecting representation proceedings generally,
may affect the disposition of some cases involving our problem. This situation occurs during the period of reconversion, from war to peacetime
economy. Sometimes, during this transition, operations are so disrupted that
any collective bargaining set-up would be impracticable. If so, the Board will
decline to proceed with a determination of the representative until conditions become more settled. 44 However, a mere reduction in the size of the
working forces or a mere change in character or size of operations, will
not bring this policy into play. The obstacle must be real and appareht.45
41
1n
42

the Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 47 N. L. R. B. 932 (1943).

1n the Matter of Briggs Indiana Corporation, 63 N. L. R. B. 1270 (1945). Cases
specifically overruled by this case on this point: In the Matter of Ford Motor Company,
47 N. L. R. B. 946 (1943); In the Matter of Briggs Manufacturing Company, 49 N. L.
R. B. 57 (1943)
(Mr. Houston first considered this question in this case; it is to
this decision he refers in his dissent in In the Matter of Briggs Indiana Corporation,
63 N. L. R. B. 1270 (1945)) ; In the Matter of Briggs Indiana Corp., 49 N. L. R. B. 920
(1943); In the Matter of The Murray Corporation of America, 49 N. L. R. B. 925
(1943); In the Matter of Arvey Corp., 50 N. L. R. B. 999 (1943) ; In the Matter of
Federal Motor Truck Co., 54 N. L. R. B. 984 (1944); In the Matter of Great Lakes
Steel Corp., 56 N. L. R. B. 242 (1944) ; In the Matter of International Harvester Co.,
Farmall Works, 56 N. L. R. B. 502 (1944); In the Matter of Reo Motors, Inc., 61
N. L. R. B. 1579 (1945).
4349 N. L. R. B. 57 (1943), see supra note 42.
44
In the Matter of Armour and Company, 62 N. L. R. B. 1194 (1945); cf. In the
of Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 63 N. L. R. B. 919 (1945).
Matter
45
In the Matter of Edison General Electric Appliance Company, Inc., 63 N. L. R. B.
968 (1945); In the Matter of Thompson Products Inc., 63 N. L. R. B. 1495 (1945);
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'II.

Thus far we have dealt with the problem of changing the bargaining
representative generally, taking up the wide variety of situations that have
arisen, and pointing out the guide-posts established by the decisions of the
Board. The rest of the article will be confined to the closed-shop contract,
where the problem of change is more complex and its difficulties are more
acute. Here the rules of individual and collective freedom of action are
more strictly limited. A certification of a new representative means a termination by the employer of a previously legal discriminatiqn against employment of the new representative's members. The problem further involves
protection of employees who desire a change yet, as a practical matter,
may be in peril due to the power of the union over its internal affairs, and
due to the ease with which the contracting union and employer may collaborate to maintain their contractual controls.
In order to face the problem it is important to see the precarious position
of the individual worker, or minority group, under existing law, if they
wish to oppose the certified union-a union which may expel them from
the union and then require the company to expel them from their jobs.
It is clear that such dissident workers cannot legally seek relief from their
employer.
For several years following the Jones and Laughlin Steel Case,46 which
upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, confusion existed as to
individual and minority rights under the Act. This was because one of the
reasons given for validating the statute was that the employer remained free
to make contracts with individual employees, even though a majority had
designated a representative. In 1944, three United States Supreme Court
decisions 47 erased all doubt and established that collective bargaining must
be entirely under the principle of majority rule so far as national policy is
concerned. The chosen union and employer, through collective bargaining,
establish and change the conditions of employment from time to time, binding all workers of a unit irrespective of individual or minority wishes or
intent. An employee cannot by any individual contract alter the conditions
In the Matter of Reliable Nut Coipany, 63 N. L. R. B. 357 (1945); In the Matter

of4 Consolidated
Vultee Aircraft Corporation, 64 N. L. R. B. 400 (1945).
6

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S.
1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
47..

I. Case Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S. 332, 64 Sup. Ct.

576 (1944); Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S.
342, 64 Sup. Ct. 582 (1944) ; Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S. 678, 64 Sup. Ct. 830 (1944). For discussion of these cases, see
Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining (1945) 45 COL. L. REv. 556.
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governing his employment. Thus, through the principle of majority rule,
whatever rights an employee theretofore had to bargain individually are
now surrendered to the certified representative. Employers, in dealing with
the certified bargaining agent, must accept this policy and abide by it. Thus,
so far as the employer is concerned, individual or minority appeals for
change or recognition must fall on deaf ears, or be referred back to the
certified representative.
What, then, may employees do to protect themselves against a union which
may expel them for their hostility? Relief in equity is the answer that might
be first suggested. However, the courts have shown a great reluctance to
meddle with the internal affairs of voluntary unincorporated associations.
Where admission to membership in a union has been requested by an original
applicant, it has been uniformly denied, both in cases of open and dosed
shops.48 In a few cases, equitable relief has been granted where the plaintiff
was a former member of the union seeking reinstatement in the face of an
arbitrary refusal to admit him or after an arbitrary suspension. 49 There is
little or no precedent at law to show what relief, if any, an employee may
have in a suit for damages. 50 However, the very nature of the injury in
most cases shows that the legal remedy is inadequate. Furthermore, the
time and money necessary to go to court is in many cases a sufficient obstacle
to prevent such actions from being maintained. In one case, 51 the employer
sued in equity and was denied relief on the basis that an injured party cannot enjoin enforcement of a by-law of a union. Thus, we see that at com45
Mayer v. Journeyman Stonecutters Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 AtI. 492 (Ch.
1890) ; Greenwood v. Building Trades Council of Sacramento, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233
Pac. 823 (1925) ; Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 17 N. E. (2d) 170 (1938);
Harmon v. United Mine Workers, 166 Ark. 255, 266 S. W. 84 (1924); Shein v. Rose,
12 N. Y. S. (2d) 87 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Seman Muller v. Bricklayers, Masons, and
Plasterers International Union of America, 6 N. J. Misc. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ;. Miller
v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; and Murphy v. Higgins,

12 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd 260 App. Div. 854, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 552
existed.
(1st
49 Dept. 1940) where a closed shop
Spayd v. Ringling Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921); Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 159 Atl. 661 (Ch. 1932); Cameron v. International Alliance,
118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 AtI. 692 (1935) ; Collins v. International Alliance, 119 N. J. Eq.
230, 182 At. 37 (Ch. 1935) ; Fleming v. Motion Picture Operators Union, 124 N. J.
Eq. 269, 1 A. (2d) 386 (1938); Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers Union of
New York and Vicinity, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 At. 720 (Ch. 1938); Dorrington v.
Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939); Carral v. Local No. 269, 133
N. 3. Eq. 144, 31 A. (2d) 223 (Ch. 1943). For a more complete discussion of the
subject, see Newman, The Closed Unionr and the Right to Work (1943)

43 COL. L.

REv. 43.
GORelief granted in Lucke v. Clothing Cutters Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505
(1893) ; denied i O'Keefe v. Local 463, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938);
Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N. E. 790 (1919).
51Rhodes v. Musicians Protective Union, 37 R. I. 281, 92 At. 641 (1915).
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mon law, there has been little that could be accomplished by way of forcing
a discriminatory union to cease its activities against qualified employees.
When the National Labor Relations Act was passed, the question of a
closed shop was the subject of considerable discussion because of the recognized monopoly it gives to labor unions, and the acts-otherwise discriminatory-which the employer must do in such a situation. The National
Railway Labor Act had outlawed the closed shop. 52 Both the Senate and
House Reports on the Wagner Act show a reluctance to have the inclusion
3
of the provision appear as a Congressional indorsement of the closed shop.
As a result, the closed shop clause was limited as much as possible by inserting it as a proviso in the subsection which in all other respects makes discrimination based on union affiliation an unfair labor practice: "Provided
that nothing in this Act ... or in any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a [statutory]
labor organization .. .to require, as a condition of employment, membership therein. . . ."'
The decisions of the Labor Board and the courts show
that this proviso has been construed very strictly, so as to assure that it
does not permit employers to discriminate against employees and unions
outside the exception created by the very letter of the proviso.5 5 But, since
the limitations imposed by the Wagner Act apply only against the employer,
the unions, so far as present legislation is concerned, are free to discriminate at will concerning internal matters.
Historically, the Labor Board has recognized this and adopted a handsoff policy regarding union affairs.&5 6 Lacking any specific authority to regulate the structure and practices of labor organizations (except as an incident
to the enforcement of Section 8 (2) of the Act prohibiting "company
unionism") the Board refused to permit alleged violations of civil or criminal law, or of moral and democratic precepts, to affect a union's status as
a bargaining agent. 5t
5248 STAT. 1188 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 152(5) (1940).
53
SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., lst Sess. (1935) 11-12;

H.

R. REP. No. 1147, 74th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 19-20; 79 CoNG. REc. 7674 (1935).
5449 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1940).
55
1n National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, 315
U. S. 685, 695, 62 Sup. Ct. 846, 851 (1942) the Court said: "The provision for a closedshop, as permitted by Section 8 (3), follows grammatically a prohibition of discrimination in hiring. These words of exception must have been carefully chosen to express
the precise nature and limits of permissible employer activity in union organization."
See56 Note (1943) 56 HAiv. L. Rv. 613.
57 1n the Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 1 N. L. R. B. 530 (1936).
1n the Matter of Eppinger & Russell, 56 N. L. R. B. 1259 (1944) ; In the Matter
of Wisconsin Gas and Electric Company, 57 N. L. R. B. 285 (1944) ; In the Matter of
Miehle Printing Press & Manufacturing Company, 58 N. L. R. B. 1134 (1944) ; In the
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During the past ten years, the public has had a growing appreciation of
the problems and injustices resulting from the existing law. At the same
time, sentiment against all form of racial and religious discrimination has
resulted in agitation for legislation forbidding such discrimination in any
field. Some states have passed statutes forbidding or restricting discriminatory rules of admission to labor unions, such as the Wisconsin Act which,
referring to close-shop contracts, requires that the State Board "shall declare any such all-union agreement terminated whenever it finds that the
labor organization invoJved has unreasonably refused to receive as a member
any employee" of the contracting employer. s
Progress against discrimination has been made recently in the courts as
well, chiefly against discrimination on account of race. The case of James
v. Marinship Corporatioi5 9 is interesting in this connection. The defendant
corporation had a closed-shop contract with the defendant union, Local
No. 6 of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders
and Helpers of America. The union refused to admit negroes, but set up
an auxiliary Local A-41 for them under which they were controlled and
dominated by the main local. Members of A-41 had to procure work clearances from Local No. 6 and pay dues. Yet they had no voice in the selection of business agent or grievance committee nor in the establishment of
job classifications. Moreover, A-41 could be abolished at any time by Local
No. 6. Local No. 6 demanded of the comparV that all negro employees
must be members of A-41 in order to be employed. In compliance with
this demand, the company gave a 48-hour discharge notice to all negroes
not affiliated with A-41.
Plaintiff, a negro employee, on behalf of himself and about one thousand
others, brought a bill in equity alleging the auxiliary was not a bona fide
union but rather a means of discriminating against negro workers. The
California Supreme Court granted an injunction restraining the union from
compelling negroes to join A-41 and from inducing or compelling the company to fire or not hire negroes for this reason; and from refusing to admit
negroes into Local No. 6 on the same terms as whites. 'Under existing conditions, the company was restrained from refusing to hire negroes without
clearance from Local No. 6, but if negroes were admitted to the union withMatter of Land O'Lakes Dairy Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 255 (1944). But see 10th
Annual
Report, National Labor Relations Board, pp. 17-18.
5
sWis. STAT. (1945) § 111.06 (1) (c); KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1945) par.
44-801; N. Y. Civm RIGHTS LAW § 43; N. Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 131; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon 1945) tit. 43, § 211.6 (1) (c) and 211.3 (f).
5925 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 Pac. (2d) 329 (1944).
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out discrimination, then the company might require the clearances.
court said:

The

"In our opinion an arbitrarily dosed or partially closed union is inincompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this case,
attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of a closed shop
agreement and other forms of collective labor action, such union occupies a quasi public position similar to that of a public service business
and has its corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same
freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal organizations. Its asserted right to choose its own members does not merely
relate to social relation; it affects the fundamental right to work for
a living." 60
In this case, the court expressly refused to pass upon discrimination where
the union does not have a monopoly, and the court laid down no test as to
what would constitute a labor monopoly. But concededly, a closed shop or
maintenance of membership would fall within the rule.6 '
The United States Supreme Court has spoken even more strongly, and
to the same effect, in the Tunstall and Steele cases 62 under the Railway
Labor Act. Here there was no closed shop, but nevertheless the court held
that where a union represents a unit of employees, it represents the minority
just as much as it does the majority, and must do so fairly and without
discrimination or any sacrifice of the rights of the minority for the benefit
of the majority. The court found that the powers and rights of the bargaining agent are comparable to those of a legislature and must be exercised
in a like manner, fairly and without discrimination.
A recent leading decision by the National Labor Relations Board regarding racial discrimination is In the Matter of Larus & Brother Company,
Inc. 63 Here, the Board recognized that it has no authority to issue orders

to labor organizations, but said that a union which discriminates against
employees in the bargaining unit in regard to tenure of employment, rates
of pay, or other substantive conditions of employment on the basis of race,
60
Contra: Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938), and
Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (Sup. Ct 1939) held such relief -required
statutory action, and resulted in N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (note 58, supra) which was
held constitutional in Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 293 N. Y. 315, 56 N. E. (2d)
72161 (1944), aff'd 326 U. S.88, 65 Sup. Ct. 1483 (1945).
New Jersey has adopted a similar rule. See Carral v. Local No. 269, 133 N. J.
Eq. 144, 31 A. (2d) 223 (Ch. 1943) and Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers
Union
of New York and Vicinity, 123 N. J.Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (Ch. 1938).
62
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210,
65 Sup. Ct. 235 (1944) ; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U. S.192, 65 Sup.
Ct. 226 (1944), both cases of discrimination against negroes.'
6362 N. L. R. B. 1075 (1945).
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color, or creed will not be permitted certification by the Board as statutory
representative. In adopting this policy, the Board is construing the term
"representative" as employed in the Act not only in the light of the express
policies of the statute (to fairly represent all employees of a bargaining
unit) ,4 but also in view of the national policy against racial discrimination.6 5
A labor organization's right to 'prescribe the qualification for membership
will be respected, but if it seeks to become the representative under a closedshop arrangement, then it must not exclude employees on a discriminatory
basis. An earlier case, decided the same year, In the Matter of Atlanta Oak
Flooring Company,66 held that a statutory bargaining agent may segregate
racial groups within its membership into separate but equally privileged
locals or branches of its organization. Thus, the present rule of the Board
is: "Neither exclusion from membership nor segregated membership
per se represents evasion on the part of a labor organization of its statutory
duty to afford 'equal representation.' But in each case where the issue is
presented the Board will scrutinize the contract and conduct of a representative organization and withhold or withdraw its certification if it finds that
the organization has discriminated against employees in the bargaining unit
67
through its membership restrictions or otherwise."
The Board concedes that its statutory authority to require a union to
offer membership to all employees in the bargaining unit, except in the
situation where the union has a closed-shop contract, is open to serious
question. The Board has said: This Board has no express "authority to
remedy undemocratic practices within the structure of union organizations,
but we have concevied it to be our duty under the statute to see to it that
any organization certified under Section 9 (c) as the bargaining representative acted as a genuine representative of all the employees in the bargaining
unit. Lacking such authority to insist that labor organizations admit all
the employees they purported to represent to membership, or to give them
equal voting rights, we have in closed shop situations held that where a
union obtained a contract requiring membership as a condition of employment, it was not entitled to insist upon the discharge of, and the employer
was not entitled to discharge, employees discriminatorily denied membership
6449 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (1940).
65

Policy found in U. S. CoNsr. AmENDS. V, XIV; ExEc. ORDER No. 8802
prohibiting discrimination in employment in war industries, and calling on
organizations to eliminate such practices; Steele and Tunstall cases, supra
Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S. 248, 65
238 (1944) ; Hunt v. Crumbach, 325 U. S. 821, 65 Sup. Ct. 1545 (1945).
6662
N. L. R. B. 973 (1945).
6710th Annual Report, National Labor Relations Board, pp. 17-18.

and 9346
all labor
note 62;
Sup. Ct.
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in the union. In such situations, being without power to order the union
68
to admit them, we have ordered employers to reinstate them."
IV.
The subject of racial discrimination has been explored in some detail
because it presents problems collateral to the ones arising out of changing
the bargaining representative, and because it is illustrative of the unilateral
action possible against employees within union structure as it exists today,
free from control. Destroying racial discrimination in unions is for several
reasons, however, much the simpler task; first, because it is more easily
recognized. The by-laws of the union will state, for example, that negroes
will not be admitted; or lacking such definite proof, investigating authorities
can at least start with the definite fact that those discriminated against were
of a particular race or creed. Secondly, the issue of racial discrimination
has become a national one, not only in labor organizations but in all phases
of society, so that the trend of general legislation outlawing such conditions
will greatly assist in cleaning them up in the labor field as well. Because
the statutes deal only with racial and religious discriminations, and because
the Board lacks power to regulate the internal affairs of unions, solution of
the general problem has been most difficult.
Lacking power to issue affirmative orders against labor organizations, the
Board has circumvented the restriction in some instances by placing an order
against the employer, whose compliance has had the effect of correcting
the union activities which the Board believes are against the policy and spirit
of the Act. The difficulty here is that the employer must bear the burden
of legal penalty alone, and in some cases even though he has acted in good
faith and without discriminatory motive. Another method has been to withhold certification of a union which the Board thinks is wrongfully discriminating against employees, based on the fact that under Section 9 of the
Act, certification by the Board is not mandatory. The difficulty here is to
know whether the'Board is going beyond its administrative powers and in
effect legislating on a matter which only Congress should decide. If so,
then a solution would be to amend the Wagner Act'giving the Board supervisory powers over the reasonableness of admission and expulsion requirements in labor orgahizations. Enforcement could be obtained by providing
that failure to meet the Board's standards would constitute an unfair labor
681n the Matter of Larus & Brothers Company Inc., 62 N. L. R. B. 1075, 1082 (1945) ;
In the Matter of Monsieur Henri Wines Ltd., 44 N. L. R. B. 1310 (1942); In the
Matter of Rutland Court Owners Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 587, 46 N. L. R. B 1040 (1943);
In the Matter of Wallace Corporation, 50 N. L. R. B. 138 (1943).
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practice and subject the union to both affirmative and negative orders similar
to those now in effect against employers ;69 or by denying such a union the
privilege of being certified by the Board as the statutory bargaining representative; or by merely denying the union the right to enter into a closedshop contract. Of these three possibilities, the first would apply the same
sort of a remedy for an unfair labor practice to the labor organization as
that which is applied to employers. Moreover, as a corrective measure it
would be effective because it applies the penalty to the precise activity which
it is desired to correct, rather than destroying other legitimate rights which
the union, or-more important-the union's members, may have under the
r
Act.70
A practical difficulty in suggesting Congressional action of this sort is
that it opens the door to those who would seek to cut down the legitimate
rights which employees have gained under the Wagner Act. By creating
one instance here where a labor organization could be guilty of an unfair
labor practice, the whole frankly one-sided theory of the Act would be
changed. Therefore, it is doubtful whether such a step would be wise; and
certainly the forces in Congress friendly to labor would be reluctant to
accept such legislation.
The other two remedies are to a certain extent now being imposed by
the Board under its existing powers. By writing them into legislation, the
question of the Board's power so to police the internal affairs of undemocratic labor organizations would be resolved, and the present policy of the
Board could be extended to open shop situations. However, here again,
there is doubt as to the wisdom in laying the Act open to attack. The Board
has done reasonably well in coping with the situation under the present
statute, and perhaps it is wiser to continue with this method of meeting the
problem, at least so long as the courts do not reject the legality of the
Board's present policy. If for other reasons, Congress should undertake
the task of overhauling the Act, provisions assuring democracy and preventing discrimination in labor organizations might well be inserted. Unless
this occurs, the evils of piecemeal amendments could well be greater than
the benefits.
Under a closed-shop contract, if the contracting -union is permitted complete control over selection and expulsion of members, and the contract is
69 For an example of a state statute setting up unfair labor practices by employees,
see70Wis. STAT. (1945) § 111.06 (2).
Failure to comply with the Board's orddr, when enforced by a court order, would
subject the union and its officers to contempt proceedings. The Board already has the
power to make such orders against the employer.
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given strict legal efficacy similar to that of commercial contracts, one can
easily see that the relationship set up between an undemocratic union and
the employer could be maintained in perpetuity. By no stretch of the imagination can one conceive that the drafters of the Wagner Act intended or
would condone such a situation, which defeats the very plfrpose of the
legislation. To prevent such a conspiracy or combination, and to achieve the
true results envisaged by the policy of Congress as stated in the Act, has
been no easy task for the Board. The courts, shackled by their traditional
devotion to the protection of contract rights, have been faced with even
more of an anomaly. Perhaps, if the drafters of the Act could have foreseen this difficulty, they would have given the Board some supervisory power
over the contracts; but it is possible that to have done so in 1935 would
have been to construct a constitutional barrier which the courts would have
found impassable.
The Board has sought to give due recognition to valid closed-shop contracts, yet it examines the facts of each case to be sure that no other section
of the Act is violated by acts resulting from the contract. Thus In the
Matter of M. & J. Tracey, Inc.,71 under a contract similar to a closed shop,
the Board permitted the employer to enforce the provisions of the agreement, on request from the bargaining agent, that only members in good
standing in that organization be permitted to hold jobs. Yet in a representation petition arising out of the same case, the Board ordered that, since the
contract in question, though valid, was for three years and over two years
of the term had expired, the contract would not bar a determination of which
union the majority of the employees now wished to represent them.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Colnpany,72 the Board had found a closed-shop contract in violation of the Act
and had ordered reinstatement of employees discharged thereunder. Here
a valid contract had existed whereby men employed at the time of the signing
of the contract were treated as being in an open shop, and all new employees
as being in a closed shop. When a rival union sought to organize the workers, the company aided the bargaining agent in coercing the old employees
to remain in the union, and closed the plant temporarily to permit the union
"to 'et their lines in order," during which time they negotiated a new contract providing for a closed shop for all. The Board was sustained in its
findings that this violated the Act which prohibits contracts entered into
7112 N. L. R. B. 916 (1939).
72315 U. S. 685, 62 Sup. Ct. 846 (1942).
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with a labor organization assisted by an employer under the closed shop
proviso of section 8 (3).
In another case, where the employer shut down his shop during rivalunion difficulties, his action was upheld. This was the leading case of In the7
" Following a close victory in a consent
Matter of Ansley Radio Corporation.
election, an A. F. of L. union signed a closed-shop contract for one year in
October, 1936. During an internal dispute in the union in the spring of
1937, the company discharged two employees who advocated switching to
the C.I.O., yet were still in good standing with the A. F. of L. The Board
held that such an act violated sections 7 and 8 (1), as coercing employees in
the exercise of their rights. Toward the end of May, 20 out of the 24
employees swung over to the C.I.O. and requested that the company bargain
with them. The company, feeling bound by its contract, referred the petitioners to the N.L.R.B., and sought aid from the Board itself without effect.
It then closed down its plant temporarily to avoid being caught by the closedshop contract and to give the workers time to reconsider. There was no
evidence of discrimination or preference shown by the company. During the
shut-down, the A. F. of L. suspended the insurgents, and notified the company that it was ready to supply workers under the contract if the company
would open up. This was done, and pursuant to the terms of the contract,
those workers not in good standing with the A. F. of L. were not rehired.
The Board held that the company's action was not an unfair labor practice.
The actual lay-offs were made under the closed-shop contract which was
valid, 74 and Chairman Madden said: ".. . to hold that a closed shop or other
collective agreement may be disrupted at any time that a majority of the
employees in the unit determine upon another bargaining representative
would open the door wide to that very instability and uncertainty in labor
75
relations which the Act is designed to remove.1
N. L. R. B. 1028 (1939).
7 The contract was actually a preferential contract, later changed to a closed shop
contract, but in either case, the discharges were valid, and the facts found by the Board
showed
that all parties and employees considered the contract as one for a closed shop.
75
Mr. Smith, dissenting, did not subscribe to the majority's desire for stability at
this price. On the grounds that the right to change representatives freely under section 9 is paramount to contractual rights under the section 8 (3) proviso, Mr. Smith
felt that the lay-off by the company was discriminatory because a change of representatives (the majority's switch to the C.I.O.) had rendered the contract no longer
effective, so that the employer would not have been bound to discharge C.I.O. members.
He felt that the employer's honesty was immaterial.
For other cases showing that under a valid closed-shop contract, the employer must
not in any other way aid the contracting union, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v.
National Labor Relations Board, 127 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) ; In the Matter
of American-West African Lines, Inc., 21 N. L. R. B. 691 (1940).
7318
4

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

(Vol. 32

The difference in approach between the courts and the Board, especially
in the early days of the Act, is well shown in the early leading case of
M. & M. Wood Working Company v. National Labor Relations Board.76
Here an A. F. of L. union had a closed-shop contract running from May 3,
1937 to March 1, 193g. On September 12, 1937, a large majority of the
workers, including union officers, transferred their allegiance to the C.I.O.,
forming a new union. They demanded jobs and were refused them by the
cdmpany which maintained that it was bound by the contract. Its position
was supported by the fact that 39 of the employees had remained in the
A. F. of L. union, whose charter stated that it could only be withdrawn in
the event that less than ten members remained in good standing. The A. F.
of L. never consented to the dissolution of the union, nor considered it
dissolved. The Board found that the C.I.O. union had succeeded to the
rights of the older union, and' ordered the company to cease and desist its
unfair labor practices under sections 7 and 8 (1) of the Act by coercing the
workers in ,their choice of representatives, etc. The Court denied enforcement of the order and sustained the position taken by the employer, holding
that the contract was valid, and therefore that there had been no discrimination. - The strict contract rule applied by the court in this case was followed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Electric Vacuum case77 in
reversing the Labor Board. The court there found that the employees were
ethically and legally bound not to disrupt the original contract to which most
of them had given written authorization. Therefore, when they brought in
an outside union organizer, they violated their agreement and became subject to discharge. Since the reversal of this decision by the Supreme Court,
the Board and the Courts have narrowed their area of divergence in approaching this problem. Thus, the rigidity of a contract no longer will be
permitted to prevent a change-in representatives where the purposes of the
Act would permit such a change.
In recent years, further progress has been made toward protecting the
rights of employees under section 9, where a closed-shop contract exists. On
the theory that freedom to make such a contract does not permit its use in
any way to block the Board's duty to determine what union the employees'
desire, a buffer period has been set up toward the end of closed-shop contracts, during which time employees may not be discharged under the contract for their activities on behalf of a rival union. This policy was established in In the Matter of Rutland Court Owners, Inc.78 In this case, two
76101 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
77120 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), rev'd in 315 U. S. 685, 62 Sup. Ct. 846 (1942).
7844 N. L. R. B. 587 (1942).
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weeks prior to the end of a closed-shop contract for one year, six of the
seven employees joined a rival union due to their dissatisfaction with their
representative. The rival notified the employer of this. Subsequently, on
request of the contracting union, five of the workers were discharged and
replacements were furnished by the contracting union. After this, a new
contract was negotiated. The Board held that the discharge of the employees
was an unfair labor practice. To discharge the very employees whose representation was in issue, because they had placed their representation in question, was held to be inconsistent with the policy of the &ct. To hold
otherwise would impair, rather than protect, self-organization, and thwart,
rather than encourage, collective bargaining by representatives of the employees' genuine choice. The Board said that the mere fact that all dosed
shops are not unlawful does not mean that they can be made perpetual
because they were validly initiated pursuant to the Act; and the workers'
right to choose their own bargaining representative necessarily includes the
right "at some appropriate time" to change that representative7 9
The Board has limited the exception period, established in the Rutland
case, to an indefinite period close to the end of the contract term. Where
a contract had eight months to run, the Board held, in a recent case,80 that
an- employer was justified in granting the contracting union's request that
an employee be discharged after his expulsion from the union for attempting
to persuade other union members to designate a rival organization as representative. The Board placed emphasis on the time element and stated that
dual unionism is justified only if the existing contract is near termination.
Just how near the end of the agreement one must be to come within the
rule is not known. Evidently the Board intends to keep its rule flexible in
this respect, and to judge each case on its own merits. Employees campaigning for a change must run the risk that the Rutland rule might not
cover them, and likewise employers are forced into the difficult position of
guessing which way the Board will hold before they discharge under a dosedshop contract. But certainty may be coming in from another quarter-the"
most recent decisions indicate that discharges for purely organizational
activities on behalf of a rival union will never be condoned by the Board
so long as the employee does all he can do to maintain his membership in
the contracting union. 8'
79

The Board cited Hamilton Brown Shoe Company v. National Labor Relations
Board, 104 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) and the Electric Vacuum case, 315 U. S.
685,
62 Sup. Ct. 846 (1942).
8
OIn the Matter of Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 65 N. L. R. B. No. 1 (1945).
81
See In the Matter of Federal Engineering Co., 60 N. L. R. B. 592 (1945), enf'd.
153 F. (2d) "233 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
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In this connection, a leading and controversial case was Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board,s 2 where the Supreme Court sustained the Board's position that a closed-shop contract was invalid where
entered into by an employer who knew at the time that the contracting union
would use it to discriminate against the members of a rival organization.
In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson took vigorous exception to
the idea that the Board, or worse in this case, the employer, should police
the conduct of unions in their collective-bargaining agreements. The majority of the court, in line with the Tunstall83 and Steele8 4 cases decided the
same day, took the view that the union selected as the bargaining agent
became the agent of all of the employees within the unit, and as such was
required to represent their interests fairly and impartially. Knowing of the
unlawful scheme, the company had a duty not to make the contract. It is
interesting to note, however, that the Court did not state squarely that the
closed shop and a closed union are illegal in combination. Since the Act
sanctions the closed shop and contains no language that suggests an intention to regulate internal union affairs, the question how far the Board and
the courts may go is left in doubt. The dissenting opinion in the principal
case, and the Board itself, 5 indicate that Congress should clear up the controversy by legislative pronouncement.
While the point is not raised by the opinions in the Wallace case, one
commentator8 6 has forcefully suggested that the discrimination by this union,
given by statute the delegated power to represent all the workers in the unit,
was sufficiently arbitrary to constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution. Although the employer should be permitted to rely
on his closed-shop contract, if entered into in good faith, the union itself
should be liable in some form of action in the courts for its unlawful discrimination against those whom it has a statutory duty impartially to represent. While this remedy would satisfactorily avoid the objectionable result
of the Wallace case-the putting of an onus on the employer to police the
contracting union-we have seen that the remedy of the employee against
82323 U. S. 248, 65 Sup. Ct. 238 (1944), affirming 141 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944), which enforced 50 N. L. R. B. 138 (1943). A five to four decision, Justices
Jackson, Stone, Roberts, and Frankfurter dissented. See also In the Matter of Wallace
Corp., 68 N. L. R. B. No. 33 (1946) ordering reinstatement of an employee discharged
after the first case began, where he had been ousted from the contracting union for nonpayment of dues. The Board said that any discharge under the contract would be
unlawful because the first Wallace case had held the contract invalid.
83323 U. S. 210, 65 Sup. Ct. 235 (1944).
84323 U. S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226 (1944).
85
See In the Matter of Larus & Brother Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 1075 (1945).
86
Dodd, The Supreme Court and Labor, 1941-1945 (1945) 58 HIv. L. REv. 1037-1040.
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the union in the courts is dubious at best, and it is doubtful that the Fifth
Amendment was meant to cover this situation. The discrimination here is
neither racial, nor religious, nor political, but arises out of the right of
unions to govern themselves and to deal with those members -who would
seek to destroy the very existence of the union from within. The fact that
some unions may abuse their privilege of self-government does not bring
the issue under the Constitutional Amendment in question.
As suggested before, an amendment to the Wagner Act outlawing a closed
union in the case of a closed-shop contract, and giving the Board power to
assure democracy in unions, would solve the particular problem. Unions
have received much from friendly legislation, which has enabled them to
grow into a permanent, recognized part of our economy. In return, the
public and individual working men'have a right to be sure that labor organizations are democratic and non-discriminatory. The issue regarding the
need for legislation was well stated by Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in the
Wallace case: "This and other cases before us give ground for belief that
the labor movement in the United States is passing into a new phase. The
struggle of the unions for recognition and rights to bargain, and of workmen
for the right to join without interferences, seems to 'be culminating in a
victory for labor forces. We appear now to be entering the phase of struggle
to reconcile the rights of individuals and minorities with the power of those
who control collective bargaining groups. .

.

. But here we deal with a

minority which the statute has subjected to closed-shop practices. Whether
the closed shop, with or without the closed union, should . . . be permitted

without supervision is in the domain of policy-making," not for the courts or
87
the National Labor Relations Board.
In view of the position taken by the majority of the Court in sustaining
the Board in the Wallace case, it would seem that legislation is not imperative at this time, although it will be remermbered that the majority does not
hold affirmatively that a closed-shop and closed-union are incompatible, and
the question of the Board's power was hotly contested by the dissenting
Justices.
Lacking any legislative pronouncement, the Board has continued along
the lines set up in the Wallace and Rutland cases. li the Matter of Federal
Engineering Company, Inc.,s8 the contracting union demanded that a member in good standing be discharged because of his organizational activity on
87

Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S. 248, 271, 65 Sup. Ct.

238, 248 (1944).

8860 N. L. R. B. 592 (1945), enforced in this respect, 153 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 6th,
1946); rehearing denied, with opinion, 155 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
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behalf of a rival union. The Board held that the contract did not provide
justification for the discharge because the employee had complied with the
membership requirements of the closed-shop contract within the meaning
of the Act. In this case, the Board expressly overruled all previous decisions
inconsistent with this holding.8 9
In the Matter of Portland Lumber Mills,90 an employee was discharged
following expulsion from the contracting union for acting as an observer
for a rival union in an election conducted by the Labor Board. The Board
held that this action violated section 8 (3) of the Act because the employer
knew of the grounds of expulsion. This was so even though the employer
had acted in good faith believing that he was bound to accede to the terms
of the contract, and the contracting union's demand for discharge.
A similar result obtained in In the Matter of Phelps Dodge Copper Products
Corporation,Habirshaw Cable and Wire Dizision,91 where a discharge of
employees for failure to maintain union membership on the basis of a maintenance of a membership contract which had expired the day before the
discharges were effected, notwithstanding the fact that the employer had
initiated the action on the failure to maintain membership prior to the
expiration of the contract, was held to violate the Act. Another interesting
development also arose out of this case, relating to the right of an employer
to execute a closed-shop contract with one of two competing unions during
the pendency of an undetermined question concerning representation. The
Board held that that was an unfair labor practice by the employer insofar
as the employees were required to join or remain members of the contracting
union as a condition of their employment.
In In the Matter of Midwest Pipingand Supply Company, Inc.,92 the Board
again held it a violation of sections 7 and 8 (1) for the employer to make
a closed-shop contract, under similar circumstances, where he had knowledge
that conflicting representation petitions, filed by both unions, were still pending. In this case, the employer had concluded honestly that the contracting
union had a majority. The Board held that nevertheless, granting a closedshop contract constituted illegal assistance to the union, and the employer
was required to withhold recognition of the contract until an adjudication by
the Board. It reasoned that its power of investigation and certification is
89
In the Matter of Taylor Milling Corp., 26 N. L. R. B. 424 (1940), and In the
Matter of United Fruit Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 404 (1939) and "other like cases" are overruled so far as inconsistent with the Federal Engineering Company case.
9064 N. L. R. B.159 (1945).
9163 N. L.R.B.686 (1945).

9263 N. L. R. B. 1060 (1945).
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exclusive, and that when a representation case is pending before the Board
an employer may not disregard the jurisdiction of the Board and preclude
the holding of an election, by resolving the conflicting claims on the basis
of proof which the employer deems sufficient but which is not necessarily
conclusive. The effect of such action is to accord unwarranted prestige and
advantage to one of two competing unions and thereby to prevent a free
choice by the employees.
V.
In writing this article, the purpose has been to produce a panoramic view
of the field, rather than to enlist in any crusade for reform. In fact, the
need for any new law to deal with this subject by itself seems doubtful.
In the many problems that have arisen affecting changes in worker's
collective bargaining representatives, the Board has done well. Those problems not completely settled are being resolved by the Board as forcefully
as possible within the allowable limits of the Wagner Act. This conclusion
is based on a belief that by adopting its approach of flexible interpretation
of the Act, the Board has fulfilled wisely its function as the administrative
agency charged with carrying out the provisions and purposes of the Act
so far as change of representatives is concerned. As pointed out before,
the drafters of such a major piece of legislation could not foresee many
problems which have arisen during the past eleven years, and Congress has
not produced any corrective amendments. Therefore, the only method has
been for the Board to draw on its general discretionary powers and lay
down a ruling which under' its interpretation best satisfied the policy of the
Act. As we have seen, the courts in recent years have generally upheld the
Board in cases within our field of discussion.
Perhaps the most controversial situation has been that arising out of the
closed-shop, and illustrated by the Rutland and Wallace cases. In both of
these situations, the Board's decisions were directed toward the, protection
of employees' rights, which is certainly in line with the policy of the Act.
That some such decisions may seem to penalize only the employer and leave
a wrong-doing union untouched is not to be doubted, but that, we submit,
should eventually be a matter for legislative action. ' One must remember
that under the National Labor Relations Act, only the employer can be held
liable, and a union can do no wrong. The field of union discipline was left by
Congress for the states. Moreover, as was pointed out by the court in
National Labor Relations Board v. Intercity Advertising Company, Inc.,
9a154 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946).
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the reported cases are few where the employer has been completely innocent.
Correction ,of the minor weaknesses of the Wagner Act should not be
undertaken piecemeal. For reasons not within the scope of thisarticle, a
general revision of the nation's labor laws seems to many to be desirable,
and the President has asked Congress repeatedly to undertake the task.
When action of this sort is taken up, the difficulties involved in changing
unions can be wiped out by amendments (also desirable for other reasons)
to insure democracy in unions and to prevent union discrimination against
employees within the bargaining unit which it represents. But as President
Truman said in his veto of the Case Bill :9 "We accomplish nothing by striking at labor here and at management there. Affirmative policy is called
for ....
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